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Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” 
effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two 
phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously 
explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion 
of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them? 
 
Resource rationality takes seemingly irrational behaviors 
and reframes them as rational or optimal given other 
constraints on agents. For example, anchoring-and-
adjustment and overestimating extreme events turn out be 
“rational” after all, by reflecting the rational allocation of 
cognitive resources. Thus, even for such classically 
irrational phenomena, “the resulting train of thought 
eventually converges to the Bayes-optimal inference” 
(p.38). 
In such cases, reasoners fall short of perfectly rational 
updating, and it is illuminating that resource- and 
performance-based constraints can accommodate such 
suboptimal reasoning. But what about cases where we 
behave not merely suboptimally, but rather against the 
norms of Bayesian inference? Here, we explore cases 
where the mind is moved by prior knowledge in precisely 
the reverse direction of what a rational analysis would 
recommend. These cases are not merely suboptimal, but 
rather “anti-Bayesian”, for actively defying Bayesian 
norms of inference. We consider two such phenomena: 
belief polarization and sensory integration. Can resource 
rationality handle them? 
First, belief polarization. Receiving evidence contrary to 
your beliefs should soften those beliefs, even if ever-so-
slightly. But this isn’t what actually happens when the 
beliefs in question are central to one’s identity — in belief 
polarization, contrary or disconfirming evidence causes 
more extreme beliefs, not more moderate ones. A classic 
example was vividly documented by Festinger, Riecken, 
and Schachter (1956): Cult members who predict the 
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world will end on some date — but who then see that date 
come and go with no cataclysm — end up strengthening 
their beliefs in the cult’s tenets, not softening them. In 
other words, credible evidence against their worldview only 
makes them hold that worldview more strongly — directly 
defying Bayesian inference norms.  
The same phenomenon can be found under laboratory 
conditions. For example, one study exposed people who 
believe that Jesus is the Son of God to a (fake) news article 
reporting that archeologists had unearthed carbon-dated 
letters from the New-Testament authors; the letters said 
the Bible was fraudulent and that its authors knew Jesus 
was not divinely born (Batson, 1975). Subjects who did 
not believe the article’s content left their beliefs about 
Jesus unchanged; but, fascinatingly, subjects who did 
believe the article’s content ended up strengthening their 
belief that Jesus was the Son of God. In other words, 
affirming new evidence against Jesus’s divine birth (~P) 
caused stronger beliefs in Jesus’s divine birth (P). Similar 
“backwards” updating is also observed for beliefs about 
nuclear safety (Plous, 1991), health (Liberman & Chaiken, 
1992), and affirmative action and gun control (Taber & 
Lodge, 2006; see also Mandelbaum, 2018).  
Why does this happen? In fact, belief polarization is not so 
mysterious: It has been known for decades, and it is even 
a predictable consequence of dissonance theory — “the 
psychological immune system” (Gilbert et. al, 1998) — 
applied to one’s values. What is mysterious is why this 
should occur in a Bayesian mind — even one constrained by 
“resources”. Belief polarization is irrational not because 
   
people are insufficiently moved by evidence, but rather 
because people are moved in the direction opposite the one 
they should be. And, importantly, these patterns cannot 
be explained by biased attitudes toward the evidence’s 
source. For example, Bayesian models of milder forms of 
belief polarization (e.g., Jern et al., 2014) suggest that 
subjects infer that contrary evidence must have come 
from unreliable sources (e.g., biased testimony); but this 
seems inapplicable to the above cases, where the sources 
are either nature itself (e.g., the world failing to end), or 
evidence the subject has actively accepted (e.g., news 
articles they endorsed). 
Indeed, “anti-Bayesian” updating is widespread, occurring 
even in basic perceptual processes. When we have prior 
expectations about new and uncertain sensory data, 
rational norms of inference say we should interpret such 
data with respect for those priors; “people should leverage 
their prior knowledge about the statistics of the world to 
resolve perceptual uncertainty” (p.40). But sensory 
integration frequently occurs the opposite way. Consider 
the size-weight illusion, wherein subjects see two equally 
weighted objects — one large and one small — and then 
lift them both to feel their weight. Which feels heavier? 
We “should” resolve the ambiguous haptic evidence about 
which object is heavier in favor of our priors; but instead, 
the classic and much-replicated finding is that we 
experience the smaller object as heavier than the equally-
weighted larger object (Buckingham, 2014; Charpentier, 
1891). This too is “irrational” — not for falling short of 
Bayesian norms of inference, but for proceeding opposite 
to them, since we resolve the ambiguous sensory evidence 
— two equally weighted objects — against the larger-is-
heavier prior, not in favor of it (Brayanov & Smith, 2010; 
Buckingham & Goodale, 2013). Indeed, this backwards 
pattern of updating is so strong that it can produce 
outcomes that are not merely odd or improbable, but even 
“impossible” (Won, Gross, & Firestone, 2019): If subjects 
are shown three boxes in a stack — Boxes A, B, and C — 
such that Box A is heavy (250g) but Boxes B&C are light 
(30g), then subjects who lift Box A alone and then Boxes 
A+B+C together report that Box A feels heavier than 
Boxes A+B+C — an “impossible” experience of weight 
(since a group could never weigh less than a member of that 
group).  
How can a “rational” account — even a resource-rational 
one — explain this? Lieder and Griffiths accommodate 
other sensory “repulsion” effects (Wei & Stocker, 2015, 
2017), but that modeling work seems inapplicable to the 
size-weight illusion. And whereas the original size-weight 
illusion could perhaps have a tortuous Bayesian 
explanation (Peters et al., 2016), Won et al.’s modification 
seemingly cannot: First, it’s unclear if previous models of 
simultaneous lifting apply to Won et al.’s temporally-
extended case; but second, there is just no logical chain of 
reasoning that should end with A alone being heavier than 
A+B+C together. 
More generally: What are the principles that lead to 
perverse “anti-Bayesian” updating? Perhaps resource 
rationality wasn’t intended to cover all cases (in which case 
it is not an “Imperial Bayesian” theory; Mandelbaum 
2018). But the problem isn’t merely that there are 
counterexamples to resource rationality, but rather that 
these are predictable, law-like counterexamples that do 
not reflect performance constraints between interacting 
mental processes. Indeed, when it comes to these more 
entrenched patterns, even “resources” may not save 
rationality. 
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Figure 1. Examples of “anti-Bayesian” updating in the mind. (a) 
Under conditions of cognitive dissonance, acquiring – and af-
firming – evidence against one’s beliefs can cause those beliefs to 
strengthen (Batson, 1975), whereas Bayesian norms of inference 
recommend softening those beliefs. (b) In the size-weight illu-
sion, one is shown two objects of different sizes but equal 
weights; when one lifts them up, the smaller one feels illusorily 
heavier than the larger one (Buckingham, 2014; Charpentier, 
1891; Won et al., 2019). In other words, ambiguous sensory data 
about which of two objects is heavier is resolved “against” one’s 
prior expectations, rather than in favor of one’s priors as recom-
mended by Bayesian norms of inference. Can resource rationality 
accommodate such paradigmatically “irrational” phenomena?
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